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Non-Lethal Force: The Slippery Slope to War?
F. M. LORENZ

From Parameters, Autumn 1996, pp. 52-62. .
In preparation for Operation United Shield, the US-led evacuation of UN forces from Somalia, Lieutenant General A.
C. Zinni, USMC, asked his staff to pursue "less lethal" alternatives in dealing with unarmed hostile elements in
Mogadishu. The intent was to use every practical and available means to deal with hostile crowds, with the goal of
saving lives and reducing confrontation.
As a result of these efforts, the I Marine Expeditionary Force became a test bed for the employment of new technology
designed to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly force. In January 1995 the deployment of Combined Task
Force United Shield fueled the debate in the United States over the need for less-lethal weapons. Some feared that the
Marines, our premier amphibious combat assault force, would be sending the message that they were too squeamish to
hurt even their enemies.[1] Others were concerned that the proliferation of less-lethal technologies would inadvertently
bridge the gap between peace and war, leading us down the "slippery slope" to deadly force (and war) with little
forethought and no debate.[2] Did Operation United Shield give birth to a new element of national power, in addition
to the traditional elements of political, diplomatic, and military? Should the United States continue to develop lesslethal weapons as an instrument of national policy? What lessons were learned from the deployment of less-lethal
weapons in Operation United Shield? This article will attempt to answer these questions based upon the experience of
the I Marine Expeditionary Force.
Background
Operation Restore Hope, an international effort to restore order to Somalia and ensure the safe delivery of relief
supplies to the starving population, began in December 1992 with great optimism. In May 1993 leadership of the
operation was turned over to the United Nations, which undertook a much more ambitious program of nation-building
and disarmament, with a much less capable force.[3] By the end of 1994 more than 130 peacekeepers had died trying
to carry out the UN mandate, on which the international community had spent more than two billion dollars. The UN
mission to Somalia was judged a failure, and the UN ordered the withdrawal of the remaining peacekeepers by the end
of March 1995. In late 1994 renewed fighting in the city of Mogadishu presented an increased danger to the departing
peacekeepers, and the UN called for US assistance to provide security to the withdrawal. The I Marine Expeditionary
Force, which had been the nucleus of the command element of Restore Hope two years earlier, was directed by US
Central Command to return to Somalia and command the US forces that supported the withdrawal.
As preparations began for the operation, it became clear that unarmed hostile elements could pose a substantial threat
to US forces. During the final days of the deployment, large bands of looters and thieves would be competing for the
booty left behind by the UN. Although Marines regularly train in crowd control, this type of training is only one part
of an intense training cycle that must occur before deployment. The I MEF took the lead in obtaining the best available
equipment that could protect lives and reduce the possibility of confrontation with unarmed groups.
The use of less-lethal weapons is a rapidly developing area for military operations, and there is still much confusion on
terminology and doctrine. The term non-lethal is currently in use by the Department of Defense. During United Shield
the terms "non-lethal," "less-lethal," and "less-than-lethal" were used interchangeably.[4] These materials will be
referred to in the balance of this article as "non-lethal" to conform to current DOD terminology. Some authors have
included information warfare, electronic warfare, psychological operations, and "enhanced sanctions" such as
interrupted power grids, transportation, credit and computer systems as non-lethal forms of war. Such is not the intent
of this article.[5] Here the concept is limited to materiel developed and employed to reduce or eliminate casualties at
the tactical or operational levels. Objectives cited above belong in a different matrix, one that concerns itself with

strategic, rather than tactical, matters.
Because of time constraints, one of the key factors in selection of non-lethal systems for United Shield was
availability. Virtually all of the munitions and weapons were required to have a two-week guaranteed delivery date to
ensure that the material would be available in Somalia when US forces needed it. Quantity was another primary
concern, as many manufacturers and distributors of non-lethal equipment do not maintain large inventories. Two
additional factors were identified in the selection and purchase of the essential equipment and munitions. The first was
performance in the field, and the second was the time required to train individuals with no previous experience in their
employment.
The final critical factor in selection of non-lethal systems was the need to be able to deliver the munitions using the
organic weapon systems in the Marine rifle company's table of equipment. Learning new delivery systems would
require additional training time and increase the combat load of the individual Marine. The decision was to require that
new material could be fired from the M203, a combination of grenade launcher and rifle, and the standard 12-gauge
shotgun. The M203 grenade launching system was compatible with the 37mm non-lethal munitions procured for
Operation United Shield and was the preferred delivery system for these munitions. The M203 includes the M-16 and
can provide lethality promptly when required. The infantry's familiarity with the M203 contributed to accuracy in nonlethal systems as well. The 12-gauge shotgun also provides versatility, and can easily be employed as a lethal weapon
by quick selection of munitions.
The reason for the procurement of non-lethal technologies was to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly
force when dealing with unarmed hostile elements. Historically, the accomplishment of military objectives has required
killing the enemy. Military force has been developed over the centuries to meet and exceed the lethality of the force
available to the adversary. The intensity of the force was never at issue, since any force was deadly and was judged
only on the outcomes: death or relative levels of destruction required to achieve an objective. But the nature and
complexity of military operations is changing. Soldiers and Marines today are much more likely to encounter unarmed
hostile elements in peacekeeping missions and other armed interventions.
In traditional land force doctrine, a gap exists between "low end" capabilities such as warnings and riot control
formations, and the conventional use of deadly force. For many military planners, this has produced a model in which
force is viewed much like a toggle switch: it's either on or off. The relatively recent availability of reliable, state-ofthe-art non-lethal weapons which undermine, weaken, or debilitate an adversary's ability to defy the will of a
commander has created opportunities unknown even a few years ago. These non-lethal alternatives could have
profound significance in operations that involve support for peace operations or humanitarian programs.
Approval of Non-Lethal Systems
Before the non-lethal systems identified by I MEF could be acquired and used in the field, detailed review and formal
approval for their use had to be obtained in Washington. A safety review was required for all systems, and Marine
Corps Systems Command issued a limited safety release for the selected systems, as well as procurement
authorization, on 14 January. Before the systems could be employed, each had to be reviewed for compliance with
international law.[6] Review was conducted by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy for systems that had received
preliminary approval. The Judge Advocate General determined that employment of the systems would be consistent
with the Law of Armed Conflict and that their use would not violate US treaty obligations.
The draft DOD directive related to non-lethal systems states the policy for their employment.[7] Oversight authority
for development and ac- quisition programs for these weapons is vested in the Senior Steering Committee. The
committee is cochaired by Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology, and the Office of
the Undersecretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict. The Office of the Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy ensures that the use of non-lethal weapons is given due consideration. DOD representatives played
a significant role in the fast-track approval process for the non-lethal weapons deployed in United Shield. There was,
however, some concern on the United Shield staff that the DOD representatives were too far removed from the field to
properly evaluate the need for the non-lethal weapons. For example, the caution expressed in the approval process for
using "sticky foam" seemed to focus on the training aspects and the dangers of suffocating a demonstrator. These

matters are more properly left to the field commander once the item is approved.
As part of the preparation for Operation United Shield, the following non-lethal systems were acquired, approved, and
deployed: 40mm systems with five types of rounds, 12-gauge systems with three types of rounds, pepper sprays,
stinger grenades, "flash bangs," and two types of foam, sticky and aqueous.[8] These systems should be distinguished
from Riot Control Agent (CS gas), which has been in the US inventory for years, and is used routinely during training.
The systems deployed in United Shield were a small sample of a range of materiel sometimes classified as non-lethal.
Rules of Engagement
Rules of Engagement (ROE) for Operation United Shield were approved and issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 4
February 1995. Most provisions of the ROE were unclassified, including the part concerning unarmed crowds or
unarmed hostile elements.[9] This provision was based on the principle of a graduated response, using the minimum
force necessary to respond to the threat. The principles of necessity and proportionality apply, and further
amplification should not be required.
The entire text of the ROE for United Shield had been delayed more than two weeks awaiting final approval of the
special ROE for non-lethal force. When the final copy of the ROE was received, just before the landings, it contained
arbitrary restrictions on the use of certain "crowd control" devices. The restrictions were based on the assumption that
there is a clear-cut distinction between the use of deadly force and all other means of force. This approach is not
consistent with the practice in the civilian law enforcement field, where the use of force is viewed as a continuum of
action rather than as a set of distinct alternatives. The materiel developed and approved for use was based on just such
a continuum, which was intended to provide a range of practical choices to troops on the ground in contact with
potentially hostile "civilians" (see Figure 1). Despite the ROE restrictions, most of the non-lethal means could be
properly employed in the sequence described in Figure 1, in the manner in which the Marines had been trained.

Publicity and Media Relations
The Task Force staff monitored media reports during the operation, and most were not helpful to the mission. On 16
February a "Pentagon official" gave detailed information about the non-lethal means that had been approved for the
operation. Even the expected length, width, and depth of the barrier foam was described. Perhaps the "official" did not
know that the Somalis follow the news and have an extraordinary ability to defeat barriers. This also put the Task
Force at a disadvantage, now that the world was anxiously waiting for "the first large-scale employment of non-lethal
weapons by US armed forces." By describing the inventory of means, but not the limits, the "official" may have raised
expectations that the Task Force could easily immobilize hostile crowds soon after the landings.
Although it was true that the Task Force had available a variety of items that were designed to save lives and reduce
the violence of confrontation, media reports sometimes focused on the new technology to the exclusion of the other
capabilities. The publicity did not mention that the systems would be used only to control unarmed crowds and that
they would never be used as a substitute for deadly force when the latter was justified. Soldiers and Marines always
have the right and responsibility to defend themselves and their units. This point was often lost on the reporters who
focused on the sensational aspects of the story. As an example, some evening news broadcasts in America ran footage
of the Ghost Busters movie, showing Bill Murray immobilized by "slime," in their reports on the non-lethal measures.
Such coverage tended to call attention to the new technology without explaining its limitations.
Training and Employment
All the systems deployed were the subject of extensive training limited only by the time and shipboard space available.
The intensive training was well received and enthusiastically supported. A high confidence level was essential for two
reasons. First, the situation in Mogadishu could promptly turn into a large-scale civil disturbance, conditions never
before encountered by these troops. Second, the fundamental concepts of employment are more critical than the
technology itself, requiring quick decisions in stressful situations.
The main landings in United Shield occurred on 28 February 1995 when over 2000 US and Italian marines came ashore
to establish a secure perimeter for the withdrawal of Pakistani and Bangladeshi soldiers. The morning of 2 March saw
the most critical part of the operation: the passage of lines and the abandonment of most of the airport to looters and
Somali militias. The final withdrawal was conducted by amphibious vehicles in the early morning hours of 3 March.
The operation was a success; all troops and equipment were withdrawn without suffering a single Task Force casualty.
Because the operation was carefully planned and executed, with advance effort in the areas of diplomatic initiative and
public awareness, there were no significant problems with crowd control or rioters during United Shield. The 40mm
and shotgun-delivered non-lethal means of force were not employed, and there was limited use of sticky foam and
"caltrops" to supplement key barrier systems at night during the final hours of the withdrawal. The non-lethal systems
will have to await another conflict to undergo a full-scale test by the US military. Nevertheless, some important
lessons came of the Somali experience that will aid in future deployments.
Lessons Learned
Capabilities and Acquisition
Operation United Shield revealed shortcomings in the US capability to identify and deploy non-lethal military systems.
Planning must begin as early as possible when a need is identified for the use of force against unarmed hostile
elements. The choice of each non-lethal system should be based on the following factors. First, is the system available
and can it be delivered to the field in a timely manner? Second, is it compatible with, and does it complement, existing
weapons and training? Third, are there clear and unambiguous guidelines and ROE for its employment? Finally, can
the system be employed effectively to save lives and contribute to mission accomplishment?
Meanwhile, others in the services should be attending to the practical issues associated with the non-lethal family of
materiel. As late as December 1994, there were few systems available, and virtually no related doctrine. The systems
need to be developed, the necessary legal review obtained, doctrine developed and tested, and the systems acquired in

sufficient quantities to deploy with future task forces. Cost will become an increasingly important factor in a time of
decreasing defense budgets. A single 40mm wood baton round costs $25. But non-lethal technology has the same
advantages as the highly touted "smart munitions"; non-lethal systems deliver the most effective force in a precise
manner, ultimately saving money, resources, and lives. A Joint Task Force Commander should have a wide range of
alternatives in the control of unarmed hostile elements.
Force Continuum
Current US military rules for the use of force make an arbitrary and unnecessary distinction between deadly force and
lesser means. This situation caused problems during the preparation of the ROE for United Shield, when certain nonlethal systems were restricted to situations where deadly force was authorized. The limitations imposed by the ROE
made no sense to the trainers and operators. If a soldier or Marine has to wait until deadly force is authorized-implying that his own life is at risk--before he can shoot a hostile with a bean bag or rubber baton, why would he or
she resort to non-lethal means at all?
The limitations on the employment of sticky foam were also unreasonable. There was apparent concern in Washington
that the foam would be used to suffocate a hostile subject. There was an erroneous assumption that the sticky foam
would be used as an anti-personnel weapon, and visions of an agitator with his head covered with a blob of foam
prevented a more careful analysis of the intended use of the foam. For Operation United Shield the substance would
have proved most useful for area denial, and then only when used in conjunction with other barrier systems such as
barricades or barbed wire. Spraying an individual demonstrator would be difficult--and unnecessary in light of the
other non-lethal items, such as rubber baton rounds, that could be directed at individuals. By limiting sticky foam to
"deadly force" situations, the ROE effectively precluded its use.
Training
Peace operations and armed interventions short of war are, by and large, characterized by restraint in the use of
firepower and violence. This stands in contrast to the wartime environment, which places a premium on aggressiveness
once the enemy has been identified. In training for these operations, traditional wartime skills, such as the return of a
high volume of fire immediately when fired upon, must be modified. Non-lethal weapons training can be viewed as a
component of training for peace operations and armed interventions. Still, we need to remember that non-lethal
systems also can have wartime applications. The next major conflict could easily involve large numbers of civilian
refugees or displaced persons, and they may not always be docile or amenable to military control.
Training for non-lethal operations must receive the same emphasis as training for war. Conventional infantry tactics
can never be abandoned, because the non-lethal tactics can never be used in isolation. With the luxury of additional
time, a land-based training site, improved doctrine, and sensible rules of engagement, soldiers and Marines will reach
a high level of proficiency in the use of non-lethal materiel.
Media and Public Perception
The media reports of United Shield's non-lethal planning posed a potential threat to mission accomplishment. Key
information that could be useful to the Somali factions was revealed, and the attention of the public was focused on a
few items of presumed magical capability. For future operations it may be necessary to classify certain non-lethal
systems to avoid the development of countermeasures by our adversaries. In any event, all involved in their
development and prospective use should avoid the release of detailed specifications of such systems.
Commands that employ non-lethal systems must develop a media plan to correctly describe the employment of nonlethal force. Capability demonstrations can be useful, but always in the context of conventional systems. A press
release may be helpful, one that makes the following points:
Soldiers and Marines will have at their disposal a variety of items that are designed to save lives and reduce
confrontation. Non-lethal means will be used only to control unarmed crowds. They will never be used as a
substitute for deadly force when such force is justified.
If crowd control items are used, the means to employ deadly force will always be available to troops on the

ground. The rules of engagement provide that US forces may always use deadly force in response to a hostile act
or hostile intent.
Concept of Employment
Although there was minimal use of non-lethal systems during United Shield, the systems were readied for use. The
realistic training completed prior to the operation revealed some deficiencies. For example, testing and training with
sticky foam revealed its inadequacy as a system to be aimed and fired directly at unarmed hostile elements. The spray
applicator systems are expensive, fragile, and have a limited capacity. Due to the small numbers of applicators
available, only a few key agitators could be sprayed. Once an agitator was sprayed, trying to apprehend him would
pose additional problems--the foam would likely entangle any US personnel who approached. The experience of
United Shield indicates that sticky foam, if used at all, should be limited to use in area denial, and then in connection
with other barriers.
The use of sticky foam as an area denial method could present additional problems in an area like Somalia. In
Mogadishu there was a serious problem with youthful unarmed thieves and trespassers penetrating the US perimeter at
night. If the sticky foam had been used to cover unattended portions of barbed wire during the night, in the morning
we could have found a dozen Somali youths stuck to the wire, entangled in a bloody trap. Removing the trespassers
from the wire would have been difficult, and it would not have played well on CNN. If sticky foam is to be used at all,
well thought-out precautions need to be taken.
The decision to employ non-lethal options must be made at the lowest possible level. Operations that intend to use
non-lethal alternatives to achieve military objectives must recognize the fluidity of the situations in which they are
likely to be employed. The decisionmaking cycle is short and stressful, and action in the force continuum can move in
both directions. Warning shots could be followed by a decision to employ a sniper to respond to a hostile act, and this
might be quickly followed by the return to non-lethal means in response to unarmed hostile elements. This approach is
consistent with concepts of the nonlinear battlefield and the commander's responsibility to make sense of chaos.
Recent Developments
The DOD Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) has an ongoing program to develop new technology for
unconventional missions and law enforcement. The program is based on an April 1994 memorandum of understanding
between the Departments of Defense and Justice. Over a 36-month period the program is to design and demonstrate
Limited Effects Technologies as an alternative to traditional military and law enforcement methods. These
technologies will be designed to "minimize personal injury or unintended damage, be environmentally benign, and [be]
socially and legally acceptable." That is a tall order, particularly in light of the extreme caution and sensitivity
demonstrated in the approval process for non-lethal systems in the run-up to United Shield.
ARPA is developing a number of technologies designed to deal with individual, crowd, riot, and mob control, as well
as "fleeing felon" and fleeing vehicles in the law enforcement context. Many of the products that emerge from this
project could have both military and civilian applications. A broad agency announcement was issued for projects in the
following areas, and the following projects are among those being funded.
Acoustics--high-intensity sound below 100hz (USAF; Armstrong Lab).
Lasers--man portable and vehicle mounted eye-safe personnel flashers (USAF; Phillips Lab).
Electrical shockers--stand off, hand-launched, electric shock projectile (JAYCOR).
Pyrotechnics--rapid bloom smoke grenades and enhanced smoke grenades (ERDEC).
These selections were made by a government board with representatives from Department of Justice, Army Training
and Doctrine Command, the Military Police School, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command, the Naval
Surface Warfare Center, and the USAF development labs. Several controversial technology programs are intended to
comply with DOD policy. For example, the laser development programs are designed to minimize any chance of
permanent sight loss through unintentional or incorrect use.[10] Other types of laser systems are absolutely vital to the
modern military; they are regularly used for detection, targeting, range-finding, and communications.

Conclusion
The experience in Operation United Shield provides a number of insights into the use of new technology to
complement traditional concepts of military force. Non-lethal weapons do not provide a new element of national
power, as some have suggested. They are merely an extension of military force to fill the gap between warnings and
deadly force. Non-lethal weapons will never become a substitute for deadly force; the right of self-defense remains
paramount and lethal means will always be available. The use of the force continuum model is preferable to the toggleswitch approach that reduces the options of a soldier, Marine, or law enforcement officer to either deadly or nondeadly force.
When properly employed, non-lethal weapons will save lives and avoid confrontations, and they will not lead us down
the slippery slope to war. There is little danger in "sending the wrong message" by merely developing and fielding
non-lethal systems. The real message will come from their employment at the tactical level. Unarmed hostile elements
will be met by the appropriate level of force, not an excessive response that causes an unintended escalation of
violence. Remember that non-lethal weapons are designed only for use against unarmed hostile elements. The threat
may be small scale, such as a thief in the night inside the wire, or a full-blown riot. The threat may be a wellorganized mob, but it could just as easily be a crowd of people motivated only by fear or hunger.
The basic assumptions related to employing military forces remain unchanged. Field the best systems available to
protect our personnel and accomplish the mission. Technology is important, but useless without effective training.
Doctrine needs to be developed, without complex rules and restrictions. We have not given birth to a magical
contrivance. Commanders in peacekeeping missions and other armed interventions short of war could, as a result of
current interest in non-lethal technologies, acquire an array of new tools to help them accomplish their missions. When
properly used, non-lethal weapons will reinforce deterrence and better protect our forces when they confront unarmed
hostile elements.
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